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BATS AND BREEZES TAKE ON FEDERAL POLICY:
THE WINDY EFFECTS OF ANIMAL WELFARE
INSTITUTE V BEECH RIDGE ENERGY LLC
I. INTRODUCTION
"Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preserva-
tion than the rich array of animal life with which our
country has been blessed."'
On December 28, 1973, President Richard Nixon spoke these
words while signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). 2
President Nixon expressed the importance of granting the federal
government authority to protect plants and animals from threats of
harm and extinction.3 The preservation and conservation of
threatened species endures as a prominent federal policy today.4
President Barack Obama recently reiterated the continued impor-
tance of protecting threatened and endangered species, as well as
the value of interagency cooperation regarding all actions poten-
tially affecting such species.5
The ESA is the primary legislative tool with which Congress ad-
dresses the increasing threats to various fish, wildlife, and plant spe-
cies. 6 While endangered and threatened species protection
1. President Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of
1973, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECr (Dec. 28, 1973), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4090 (transcribing President Nixon's statement
when signing Endangered Species Act of 1973).
2. Id. (describing circumstances of President Nixon's statement when signing
Endangered Species Act of 1973); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2006).
3. See Nixon, supra note 1 (stating, "this legislation provides the Federal Gov-
ernment with needed authority to protect an irreplaceable part of our national
heritage-threatened wildlife.").
4. See Memorandum on the Endangered Species Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 9753 (Mar.
3, 2009) (evidencing ESA's continued importance). President Barack Obama de-
scribed the ESA as "one of the Nation's profound commitments" and reiterated
the importance of "interagency consultation to ensure the application of scientific
and technical expertise to decisions that may affect threatened or endangered spe-
cies." Id.
5. See generally id. (stressing importance of ESA and interagency cooperation
when agency's action might affect protected species).
6. See Endangered Species Act § 1531(b) (explaining purpose of ESA). Ac-
cording to its drafters, the ESA was intended "to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered and
threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the treaties." Id.
(225)
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remains a prominent federal policy, it is often overshadowed by is-
sues more visible to the general public, such as the effects of cli-
mate change and ever-increasing energy demands.7 As heat waves
plague the country, increasingly intense hurricanes pound the
shorelines, and rising sea levels threaten coastal towns, the nation
takes greater notice of climate change.8 Americans also increas-
ingly feel the repercussions of increased energy demands on oil
prices, escalating electricity bills, and growing agricultural produc-
tion costs. 9
Federal policies addressing climate change target the nation's
growing energy demands.' 0 A direct relationship exists between
certain human activities and greenhouse gas emissions, the underly-
ing cause of climate change." Therefore, government regulation
of climate change focuses on measuring, reducing, and monitoring
greenhouse gas emissions from various human activities.' 2 Presi-
7. Compare Memorandum on the Endangered Species Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at
9753 (evidencing current importance of ESA), with Reliable, Affordable, and Environ-
mentally Sound Energy for America's Future, NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEv. GROUP, 2.1-
2.12 (May 2001), http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/press/2001/nep/na-
tional energy-policy.pdf [hereinafter Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound
Energy] (explaining visibility of energy crisis to general public), and Climate Change
Indicators in the United States, EPA, 4-7 (Apr. 2010), http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/indicators/pdfs/Climatelndicatorsfull.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change ln-
dicators] (summarizing climate change indicators).
8. See generally Climate Change Indicators, supra note 7, at 4-7 (providing cogent
analysis of significant indicators of climate change in United States).
9. See generally Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy, supra note
7, at 2.1-2.12 (explaining various forms in which energy crisis is visible to general
public).
10. See generally U.S. Domestic Response to Climate Change: Key Elements of a Prospec-
tive Program, PEW CENTER ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUp
loads/policy-inbrief_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing United States'
focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions in response to climate change). In
order to reduce climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must be restricted. Id.
Methods of reducing greenhouse gas emissions include increasing energy effi-
ciency and developing renewable energy sources such as biofuels, wind, hydrogen,
and solar technologies. Id. at 4.
11. See generally Climate Change Indicators, supra note 7, at 9-18 (exploring rela-
tionship between human activities and greenhouse gas emissions). Greenhouse
gases are found in the atmosphere, with some naturally formed and others the
result of human activities. Id. Once emitted into the atmosphere, greenhouse
gases can potentially alter the Earth's climate when unbalanced. Id. at 18. Human
activities contributing to the influx of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere include
burning fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal), solid waste, trees, and wood prod-
ucts; the production and transport of coal, natural gas, and oil; and industrial activ-
ities. Id. at 9. Thus, in order to reduce the effects of climate change, regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions is imperative. Id.
12. See Climate Change Science Facts, EPA, 1-2 (Apr. 2010), http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/downloads/ClimateChangeScienceFacts.pdf (describing causes
of climate change); see also Climate Change Indicators, supra note 7, at 9 (exploring
historical U.S. greenhouse gas emission rates); see also Energy & Environment, THE
2
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dent Obama recently signed an Executive Order setting measure-
able greenhouse gas reduction targets for federal agencies,
exemplifying the federal government's dedication to addressing
these important issues.1 3 The Order instituted these reduction
targets in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas pollution and build a
"clean energy" economy. 1 4
The federal government has devoted tremendous efforts to de-
velop clean, renewable energy sources as a means to reduce green-
house gas emissions and facilitate the nation's ability to meet its
increasing energy demands.' 5 The government's efforts simultane-
ously reduce the deleterious effects of greenhouse gas emissions on
climate change.1 6 Clean energy sources, such as wind, solar, and
biofuels, benefit the environment and society due to their low emis-
sions and ability to produce energy at a substantially lower cost than
fossil fuels.1 7 Wind energy, one of the most widely available and
economically competitive renewable energy sources, has notably ex-
perienced a surge in implementation over the past few years.18
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy-and-environment (last
visited Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Energy & Environment] (enumerating regulatory
actions taken to reduce greenhouse emissions).
13. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009) (pledging to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
14. See id. (explaining that the federal government must lead by example
"[i]n order to create a clean energy economy that will increase our Nation's pros-
perity, promote energy security, protect the interests of taxpayers, and safeguard
the health of our environment").
15. Cf Gautam Naik, Energy Push Spurs Shift in US. Science, WALL ST. J., Nov.
25, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125910876247663245.html#articleTabs
%3Darticle (describing use of 18% increase in federal funding in fiscal year 2009
to develop new electricity sources, build more efficient cars, and address climate
change); see generally Tina R. Goel, Note, Finding the Balance: Harmonizing Renewable
Energy with Wildlife Conservation, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 42, 42 (2010) (dis-
cussing current importance of renewable energy sources).
16. See Energy &Environment, supra note 12 (explaining how renewable energy
use enables United States to control dependence on foreign oil and reduce green-
house gas pollution contributing to climate change).
17. See generally Renewable Energy 2000: Issues and Trends, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC & ALTERNATIVE FUELS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
73 (Feb. 2001), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/renewables/06282000.pdf (ex-
plaining basis for increased interest in wind energy).
18. Id. at 89 (discussing changing use of wind power); see also Building a New
Energy Future with Wind Power, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1 (May 2010), http://wwwl.
eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/eere-windwater.pdf (describing recent
trends in wind power). In 2009, wind power represented 40% of all new U.S. elec-
tric generation capacity. Id. The Department of Energy forecasts, however, that
wind energy will produce 20% of all U.S. electricity by 2030. See generally 20% Wind
Energy by 2030: Increasing Wind Energy's Contribution to U.S. Electricity Supply, U.S.
DEP'T. OF ENERGY (July 2008), http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/
41869.pdf (offering forecast of wind energy production by 2030).
3
Balzer: Bats and Breezes Take on Federal Policy: The Windy Effects of Ani
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
228 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XXII: p. 225
While reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires research
and development of alternative energy sources, officials must ad-
minister these efforts in accord with existing federal policies, in-
cluding the ESA.19 Media outlets and environmentalists often
scrutinize wind energy projects for their possible ill effects on ani-
mals and habitats.20 Transportation of equipment, clearing of pro-
ject sites, and operation of wind turbines all have the potential to
injure protected animals and surrounding habitats.21 Nonetheless,
the protection of threatened and endangered species and their
habitats will not hinder wind energy's development as an alterna-
tive energy source, so long as these two federal objectives operate in
concert.22
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland recently
reiterated that federal policies in this arena must operate in uni-
son.23 In Animal Welfare Institute v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC (Beech
Ridge Energy),24 the district court concluded that the Beech Ridge
Project, a wind energy project, was reasonably certain to "take" Indi-
ana bats in violation of the ESA's take prohibition. 25 The court ad-
dressed two crucial issues of first impression for the Fourth
Circuit.2 6 First, the court determined whether the ESA's citizen suit
provision permitted an individual to institute a lawsuit based en-
tirely on a future ESA violation.27 Second, the court addressed a
challenger's burden of proof to establish a "taking" of a protected
species under section 9 of the ESA.28 Regarding the second issue,
the court speculated that the requisite degree of certainty was
merely an issue of "academic interest"; however, the issue is pro-
foundly vital to the proper adjudication of take violations.29 Both
19. See generally Goel, supra note 15, at 42 (discussing importance of renewa-
ble energy production compliance with federal environmental laws).
20. See id. (explaining criticisms of wind energy developments).
21. See id. (detailing concerns resulting from development of wind energy de-
spite fewer adverse environmental effects than fossil fuels).
22. See Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging Alterna-
tive Energy Sources? 46 IDAHO L. REv. 509, 534-35 (2010) (describing ability of re-
newable energy sources to work in conjunction with existing federal policies).
23. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 583 (D.
Md. 2009) (explaining wind energy facilities must "be good neighbors").
24. 675 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D. Md. 2009).
25. See id. at 579-80 (stating holding of case).
26. See id. at 560-64 (explaining issues of first impression for Fourth Circuit).
27. See id. at 561 (identifying justiciability of wholly future ESA violation as
issue of first impression for Fourth Circuit).
28. Id. at 561-64 (identifying requisite degree of certainty under ESA as issue
of first impression for Fourth Circuit).
29. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 564 n.31 (admitting that
"[ulltimately, the question of the applicable degree of certainty may be only of
4
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issues are imperative to a court's ability to comprehensively apply
the ESA's take provision to existing and future wind energy facili-
ties located in close proximity to endangered species' habitats.3 0
This Note examines the district court's rationale in Beech Ridge
Energy, the impact of the holding on the currently inconsistent judi-
cial interpretations of the ESA, as well as the subsequent impact of
the case on future clean energy efforts.3 1 Part II provides a detailed
summary of the facts of Beech Ridge Energy.32 Part III then analyzes
the relevant ESA text in conjunction with prior court decisions in-
terpreting this language.33 Next, Part IV examines the rationale
employed by the District Court for the District of Maryland to reach
its holding. 34 Thereafter, Part V evaluates the court's rationale in
light of the specific applicable statutory provisions and prior court
decisions.3 5 Finally, Part VI considers the impact, both favorable
and unfavorable, of Beech Ridge Energy on future interpretations of
the ESA and clean, renewable energy initiatives.36
II. FACTS
In Beech Ridge Energy, the District Court for the District of Mary-
land determined whether the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated
that the construction and operation of a wind energy project by the
defendants would take Indiana bats in violation of the ESA.3 7 Indi-
academic interest"); but see Paul Boudreaux, Comment, Understanding 'Take' in the
Endangered Species Act, 34 Auz. ST. L.J. 733, 739 (2002) (detailing various standards
of proof applied by courts and importance of these standards).
30. For a discussion of the impact of various standards of proof, see infra
notes 231-41 and accompanying text.
31. For a narrative analysis of Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, see
infra notes 128-65 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the holding in
this case, see infra notes 166-210 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the relevant facts of Beech Ridge Energy, see infra notes
37-67 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of background material pertaining to the Endangered
Species Act and relevant court decisions, see infra notes 68-127 and accompanying
text.
34. For a narrative analysis of the court's opinion in Beech Ridge Energy, see
infra notes 128-65 and accompanying text.
35. For a critical analysis of the district court's holding in Beech Ridge Energy,
see infra notes 166-210 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the impact of the district court's holding, see infra
notes 211-49 and accompanying text.
37. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 564 (D.
Md. 2009) (describing issues involved). As plaintiffs, Animal Welfare Institute con-
sisted of two non-profit organizations and an individual. Id. at 542. As defendants,
Beech Ridge Energy consisted of Invenergy Wind LLC, the fifth largest wind devel-
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ana bats were first listed as an endangered species in 1967,38 when
the estimated Indiana bat population was twice as large as it is to-
day.39 These small, social bats are most commonly found through-
out the Midwest region of the United States, as well as along the
Appalachian Mountains, where they roost during the summer
months in maternity colonies and migrate to caves or abandoned
mines during the winter months to hibernate. 40
In 2005, Beech Ridge Energy sought to construct and operate
the Beech Ridge Project in Greenbrier County, West Virginia.41
The Beech Ridge Project is a wind farm facility consisting of 122
wind turbines along twenty-three miles of the Appalachian Moun-
tain ridgeline.42 The Animal Welfare Institute initiated the forego-
ing litigation in 2009 based on an allegation that the construction
and operation of the Beech Ridge Project would violate the ESA by
taking Indiana bats.43 Thus, the Animal Welfare Institute sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the construction and op-
eration of the Beech Ridge Project.4 4 As the challenger, the Animal
Welfare Institute bore the burden of proving that the Beech Ridge
Project happened to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
38. Notice of Public Hearing Regarding Wilderness Study, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001-
01 (Mar. 11, 1967) (listing Indiana bat as endangered species).
39. See Andy King, 2009 Rangewide Population Estimate for the Indiana Bat (Myotis
sodalis) by USFWS Region, FWS, 1 (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.fws.gov/midwest/
endangered/mammals/inba/pdf/2009inbaRangewidePopApril201O.pdf (estimat-
ing 2009 Indiana bat population at 387,835); see also Indiana Bat (Myotis sodalis),
FWS, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/Endangered/mammals/inba/index.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2011) (explaining that current population of Indiana bats is less
than half as many as when initially listed as endangered).
40. Indiana Bat (Myotis sodalis), FWS, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/Endan-
gered/mammals/inba/index.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (explaining behav-
ioral patterns of Indiana bats); see also Myotis sodalis: Distribution, NATURESERVE
EXPLORER, http://www.natureserve.org/explorer/servlet/NatureServe?search
Name=Myotis+sodalis (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (depicting geographical distribu-
tion of Indiana bats).
41. See generally Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (describing location
of Beech Ridge Energy).
42. See generally id. (explaining details of Beech Ridge Project). Beech Ridge
Energy planned to construct the Beech Ridge Project in two phases: the first phase
consisted of sixty-seven turbines and the second phase consisted of fifty-five tur-
bines. Id. The entire project was estimated to cost over $300 million and was de-
signed to produce electricity equivalent to the amount that 50,000 West Virginia
households consume in a typical year. Id. at 548-49.
43. See id. at 542 (describing Animal Welfare Institute's lawsuit against Beech
Ridge Energy).
44. See id. (identifying relief sought).
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conduct."4 5 The court, therefore, focused on two primary issues in
Beech Ridge Energy: first, the presence of Indiana bats at the Beech
Ridge Project site; and, second, whether the Beech Ridge Project
was reasonably certain to take Indiana bats in violation of section 9
of the ESA. 46
Beech Ridge Energy hired an environmental consultant, BHE
Environmental (BHE), in 2005 to establish the viability of the
Beech Ridge Project's physical location. 47 BHE was thereafter re-
sponsible for consulting with the appropriate regulatory agencies to
ensure the project complied with all applicable regulations.4 8 BHE
consulted the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) office in West
Virginia regarding Beech Ridge Energy's intent to utilize a mist-net
survey to ascertain the presence of protected species, specifically
the Indiana bat, at the desired site. 4 9 The FWS recognized the pro-
posed survey as "a reasonable level of effort," but warned BHE that
the proposed survey would only determine the presence of bats in
the summer months.5 0
BHE conducted a mist-net survey over a four-day period in July
2005, and captured a number of bats-none of which were Indiana
bats.51 Based on the mist-net survey results and various post-con-
struction mortality surveys, BHE drafted a Chiropteran Risk Assess-
ment indicating Indiana bats might be present at the Beech Ridge
Project site, and estimating the wind energy facility would cause
6,746 annual bat deaths.5 2 In response, both the FWS and the West
45. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006)
(prohibiting taking protected species); Endangered Species Act § 1532(19) (defin-
ing take).
46. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (indicating case's central issues).
47. See id. at 549 (describing role of BHE). Beech Ridge Energy hired BHE in
order to assess the potential risks the Beech Ridge Project might pose to bats. Id.
BHE project manager, Russ Romm6, acted as the primary consultant between the
FWS and Beech Ridge Energy. Id.
48. Id. (describing BHE's responsibilities).
49. Id. (discussing dialogue between BHE and FWS). Mist-net surveys use a
tightly woven net hoisted near likely bat habitats to capture, identify, and release
bats that become entangled in the net. Id. at 549 n.9.
50. Id. (discussing FWS's response to proposed mist-net survey).
51. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 549-50 (describing first mist-net sur-
vey). The July mist-net survey was conducted "during full moon or near full moon
conditions" and evaluated fifteen potential turbine locations. Id. The survey cap-
tured seventy-eight bats, none of which were Indiana bats, but several bats escaped
from the mist net prior to identification. Id. at 550. The bats captured and identi-
fied included post-lactating females and juveniles of the same species as Indiana
bats. Id.
52. Id. at 550 (explaining BHE's conclusions in Chiropteran Risk Assess-
ment). BHE submitted its conclusions regarding the risks posed to bats in a draft
Chiropteran Risk Assessment to the FWS and the West Virginia Department of
2011] 231
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Virginia Department of Natural Resources warned BHE and Beech
Ridge Energy of their conclusions' limited nature and, thus, urged
that further surveys were necessary.53
The FWS sent the first of three formal letters to the BHE pro-
ject manager in March 2006, reiterating its concerns about the lim-
ited scope of the mist-net survey, the presence of Indiana bats, and
the potential harm the Beech Ridge Project might inflict upon the
Indiana bat population.54 Consequently, in June 2006, BHE con-
ducted a second mist-net survey but again captured no Indiana
bats. 55 BHE submitted a final Chiropteran Risk Assessment prior to
the completion of the second mist-net survey, concluding that, due
to the improbable presence of Indiana bats at the Beech Ridge Pro-
ject site, the wind energy facility posed a low risk of harm to Indiana
bats.5 6 The FWS sent a second formal letter to the BHE project
manager in response, which expressed its continued concerns and
again recommended further, more prolonged studies.5 7
On August 28, 2006, the West Virginia Public Service Commis-
sion concluded that the evidence corroborated the absence of Indi-
ana bats near the proposed wind energy facility and, thus,
reluctantly issued the necessary certification for the construction
and operation of the Beech Ridge Project.58 The FWS sent its final
Natural Resources. Id. BHE based its conclusions on the mist-net survey results
and post-construction mortality studies that were conducted at another West Vir-
ginia wind energy facility. Id. at 547, 550. BHE recognized the possibility that
Indiana bats were present at the Beech Ridge Project site and the related possibil-
ity of injury from the turbines. Id. at 550.
53. See id. at 550-51 (detailing conference call between BHE, Beech Ridge
Energy, FWS, and West Virginia Department of Natural Resources). The regula-
tory agencies believed the mist-net surveys were adequate for the summer months
and thus determined that clearing land for the turbines would not affect Indiana
bat maternity colonies. Id. at 551. The agencies remained concerned, however,
regarding the impact of the project on migrating and swarming Indiana bats. Id.
BHE further conducted surveys of caves within the Beech Ridge Project site in
March 2006, but found no Indiana Bats. Id.
54. Id. at 551 (describing first formal FWS letter sent to BHE). FWS recom-
mended further surveys prior to construction of the Beech Ridge Project, multi-
year studies, and use of various technologies. Id.
55. Id. at 552-53 (describing second mist-net survey). The second mist-net
survey did not heed any FWS recommendations regarding surveying during the
fall months. Id.
56. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (describing final Chiropteran
Risk Assessment). The final Chiropteran Risk Assessment assumed no Indiana bats
would be identified in the second mist-net survey. Id.
57. See id. at 554 (detailing second formal FWS letter to BHE).
58. See id. (describing conclusions of West Virginia Public Service Commis-
sion). The West Virginia Public Service Commission issued the certification based
on the initial mist-net survey capturing no Indiana bats, testimony of a Beech
Ridge Energy witness regarding Indiana bat behavior, and the lack of historic hi-
8
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formal letter to the BHE project manager on July 31, 2007, empha-
sizing its continued concerns regarding the Beech Ridge Project's
potential adverse impact on Indiana bats and the insufficiency of
BHE's analysis and data.5 9 Additionally, the FWS noted the availa-
bility of the incidental take permit (ITP), which would authorize
the Beech Ridge Project's taking of a protected species if it were
"incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an other-
wise lawful activity."60 After a four-year endeavor to construct and
operate a wind energy facility in Greenbrier County, West Virginia,
Beech Ridge Energy obtained final authorization to construct the
Beech Ridge Project on February 13, 2009, and commenced con-
struction of the wind turbine project without an ITP.61
The Animal Welfare Institute sought to halt the construction
and operation of the Beech Ridge Project by seeking an injunction
based on an allegation that the project would violate the ESA's take
provision.62 The District Court for the District of Maryland initially
focused on the justiciability of the claim, which was based entirely
on a future ESA violation, and the burden of proof required to
demonstrate a taking.6 3 The court then determined whether the
Beech Ridge Project violated ESA section 9.64 The court held that
the ESA did in fact protect endangered species from wholly future
violations; therefore, Beech Ridge Energy could be in violation of
the take provision without a showing of a past or current viola-
bernacula near the wind turbines. Id. The certification contained numerous
preconstruction and post-construction conditions, but permitted Beech Ridge En-
ergy to construct 124 wind turbines. Id. at 554-55. The West Virginia Public Ser-
vice Commission declined to reconsider the issuance of the certificate, which the
plaintiff challenged up to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Id. The
court affirmed the issuance of the certificate. Id. at 556.
59. See id. at 556 (describing final formal FWS letter). The FWS confirmed its
prior concerns that "one summer season of mist-netting surveys is likely insuffi-
cient to determine species presence." Id.
60. Id. at 554 (describing availability of ITP); see also Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(1)(B) (2006) (providing ITP provision). At the time of
trial, Beech Ridge Energy had not applied for an incidental take permit. Beech
Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 557 (describing lack of ITP application).
61. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 557 (describing status of Beech
Ridge Project at time of trial). The West Virginia Public Service Commission ena-
bled Beech Ridge Energy to commence construction after determining it had satis-
fied all conditions. Id. By the start of trial, Beech Ridge Energy had already begun
the construction of sixty-seven turbines as part of the first phase of Beech Ridge
Project. Id.
62. See id. at 542 (describing basis of lawsuit).
63. See id. at 560-64 (explaining court's rationale). For a further discussion of
the district court's analysis, see infra notes 128-65.
64. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 576-80 (determining whether
Beech Ridge Energy violated ESA section 9). For a further discussion of the likeli-
hood that the Beech Ridge Project would take Indiana bats, see infra notes 162-65.
2011] 233
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tion.65 The court also held that a plaintiff must demonstrate a vio-
lation of the take provision by a preponderance of the evidence,
meaning the activity in question must be reasonably certain to im-
minently take a protected species. 66 The Animal Welfare Institute
successfully met its burden, and the court accordingly issued an in-
junction against Beech Ridge Energy.67
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Cornerstone of Federal Regulation to Protect
Endangered and Threatened Species - The Endangered
Species Act of 1973
The ESA, heralded as "the most comprehensive legislation for
the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any na-
tion," provides the vital framework that protects threatened and en-
dangered species, as well as their habitats, from injurious human
conduct.68 The ESA recognizes the "aesthetic, ecological, educa-
tional, historical, recreational and scientific value" of threatened
species to the United States and purports to conserve endangered
and threatened species for future generations.69 Species are listed
as endangered or threatened under the ESA based on the level of
threat the species faces, and they subsequently receive protection
from prohibited human conduct.70 Government agencies must
consult with the FWS and the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmos-
65. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61 (describing holding on
wholly future ESA violation issue). For a further discussion of the justiciability of
wholly future take claim, see infra notes 13547.
66. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 561-64 (describing holding on
requisite degree of certainty issue). For a further discussion of the district court's
determination that reasonable certainty of imminent harm is sufficient, see infra
notes 148-61.
67. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 564, 580 (holding injunction
appropriate to enjoin all operations of wind turbines at Beech Ridge Project).
68. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (describing significance
of ESA); see also Sabrina C. C. Fedel, A Cause of Action for "Taking" of Wildlife Under
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 13 CAUSES OF AcriON 2D 273, § 2 (2010)
(providing general overview of ESA).
69. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006) (explaining
findings, purpose, and policy supporting ESA's promulgation).
70. Id. § 1533 (describing governmental process of listing species as endan-
gered or threatened to ensure protection); see also Listing a Species as Threatened or
Endangered, FWS, 1-2 (July 2009), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/
pdf/listing.pdf (describing prerequisites and process for listing species as
threatened or endangered). Endangered species are defined as "any species which
is in danger of extinction through all or a significant portion of its range." Endan-
gered Species Act § 1532(6). Threatened species, meanwhile, are defined as "any
species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(20).
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pheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries Service to ensure that any
activities they authorize, fund, or carry out are not likely to harm
any protected species or damage their habitats.71 While the FWS
and NOAA are primarily responsible for ESA enforcement, the ESA
citizen suit provision also grants enforcement authority to individu-
als via private rights of action. 2
B. Citizens Empowered to Defend and Safeguard Protected
Species
The Clean Air Act of 1970 contained the first citizen suit provi-
sion in any environmental statute, which became the exemplary citi-
zen suit provision for subsequent environmental regulations,
including the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the ESA.7 5 Environmen-
tal citizen suit provisions empower citizens to commence an action
in order to remedy a violation of the underlying regulation. 7 4
These provisions encourage enforcement of environmental regula-
tions and can potentially compel statutorily-mandated agency ac-
tion.75  The Supreme Court scrutinized the CWA's citizen suit
provision in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc. (Gwaltney)' 6 and held the provision did not confer jurisdiction
71. See generally Summary of the Endangered Species Act, EPA, http://vww.epa.
gov/lawsregs/laws/esa.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (describing ESA basics); see
also Listing and Critical Habitat: Overview, FWS, http://www.fivs.gov/endangered/
what-we-do/listing-overview.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (explaining process of
including species on List of Endangered and Threatened Species).
72. See Endangered Species Act § 1540(g) (stating ESA citizen suit provision).
73. See generally Charles N. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After
Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or the Agony of Defeat?, 15 WM. MrTcHELL L. REv. 327,
327-38 (1989) (detailing origin of citizen suit provisions). The citizen suit provi-
sion within the Clean Air Act (CAA) provides that "any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person . . . who is alleged to have
violated . . . or to be in violation [of this Act]." Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a) (2006) (providing cause of action to individuals). The Clean Water Act
(CWA) similarly provides that "any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf against any person . .. who is alleged to be in violation of [this Act]." Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) (offering citizen suit provision). Likewise,
the Endangered Species Act provides that "any person may commence a civil suit
on his own behalf to enjoin any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof." Endan-
gered Species Act § 154 0(g) (laying out citizen suit provision).
74. See Nauen, supra note 73, at 328-32 (describing effect of citizen suit
provisions).
75. See id. (listing various impacts of citizen suits); see also Robert B. June,
Comment, The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the Scope of Con-
gressional Power, 24 ENvrTL. L. 761, 762 (1994) (explaining basic purpose of citizen
suit provisions).
76. 484 U.S. 49, 54 (1987).
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to courts over claims alleging wholly past violations.77 On remand,
the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's holding to rec-
ognize the justiciability of continuous or intermittent CWA
violations.78
The ESA incorporates a similar citizen suit provision that au-
thorizes citizens to commence an action to remedy ESA viola-
tions.79 Most often, successful citizen suits result in an injunction
against the unlawful conduct.s0 Section 11 of the ESA provides that
"any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf. . . to
enjoin any person... who is alleged to be in violation of any provi-
sion of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority
thereof."8' Similar to the Fourth Circuit's holding on remand in
Gwaltney, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a citizen suit alleging a
prohibited taking of a protected species does not require.a past in-
jury to the species.82 In Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber
Co. (Rosboro),83 the circuit court held that an injury occurring at
some point - past, present, or future - was sufficient to establish a
cause of action so long as the plaintiff proved future injury with the
requisite degree of certainty.8 4
The Supreme Court addressed the ESA in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon (Sweet Home)85 soon after
the Rosboro decision.86 The thrust of the Court's decision sur-
rounded a facial challenge to the legitimacy of the FWS redefini-
tion of "harm" to include habitat modification.87 The Supreme
Court held, "the Government cannot enforce the §9 prohibition
until an animal has actually been killed or injured."88 Thereafter,
77. See id. at 64 (concluding CAA bars citizen suits for wholly past violations).
78. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170,
172 (4th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Supreme Court's holding on remand).
79. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 154 0(g) (2006) (providing
ESA citizen suit provision).
80. Id. (describing citizen suit remedies).
81. Id. (quoting ESA citizen suit provision).
82. Compare Chesapeake Bay Found., 844 F.2d at 172 (recognizing justiciability
of continuous or intermittent CWA violations), with Forest Conservation Council v.
Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding no past injury re-
quired by section 9).
83. 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995).
84. Id. at 784 (describing Ninth Circuit's holding regarding requisite degree
of certainty).
85. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
86. Id. at 698 (addressing re-definition of harm).
87. See id. at 692 (describing plaintiffs' challenge to statutory validity of Secre-
tary of Interior's harm definition including habitat modification).
88. Id. at 702-03 (explaining required proof of section 9 violation). The
Court compared section 9 of the ESA, the take provision, to section 5 of the ESA,
12
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in Marbled Murrelet v. Babbit (Marbled Murrelet) ,89 the Ninth Circuit
clarified that Sweet Home had no effect on its prior determination in
Rosboro, namely that actual death or injury to an endangered spe-
cies was not required, and a "reasonably certain threat of future
harm is sufficient."90
After the Supreme Court's decision in Sweet Home, the First Cir-
cuit confirmed its prior decisions in Strahan v. Linnon (Strahan)91
and reiterated the bar against citizen suits without a showing of ac-
tual harm.92 In earlier decisions, the First Circuit relied specifically
on the ESA definition of harm and other circuit cases to support its
conclusion that injunctive relief is only proper after the plaintiff
demonstrates that the activity, if continued, will actually injure the
protected species.93 According to the First Circuit, a citizen suit al-
leging an ESA violation is not justiciable until an actual injury oc-
curs.94  Consequently, a circuit split exists regarding the
justiciability of claims based entirely on future ESA violations.95
C. No Taking Protected Species
Section 9 of the ESA, the take provision, is a major source of
litigation because it prohibits all actions affecting a taking of a pro-
tected species.96 The ESA makes it "unlawful for any person subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States to... take any such species
within the United States."9 7 Prohibited takings are further defined
the land acquisition provision. Id. Section 5 provided for the protection of a
habitat before a seller's activity harms a protected species. Id. In contrast, section
9 could not be enforced until an animal has actually been injured or killed. Id.
89. 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996).
90. Id. at 1068 (holding Sweet Home did not overrule prior findings that rea-
sonably certain threat of future harm is sufficient to support permanent
injunction).
91. No. 97-1787, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998).
92. See id. at *13 n.6 (holding that "even a significant risk of harm" to endan-
gered species is insufficient).
93. See id. (citing Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
plaintiff must show actual harm to endangered species). The precedent on which
the First Circuit relied, American Bald Eagle, repudiated the availability of injunctive
relief for a conjectural harm to a species based on the language of the ESA, the
definition of harm, and guidance provided by the FWS. Am. Bald Eagle, 9 F.3d at
165-66 (defining harm).
94. See Strahan, No. 97-1787, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, at *13 n.6 (clarify-
ing First Circuit's adherence to showing of actual harm).
95. For a discussion of the circuit split regarding the justiciability of future
ESA violation claims, see supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 735-36 (explaining importance
of ESA section 9).
97. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B) (2006) (offer-
ing ESA take provision).
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by Congress as actions that "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct."98 Congress intentionally defined section 9 broadly
in order to encompass any possible way in which a person could
take a protected species.99 Thus, courts interpret the parameters of
the take provision by applying precedential decisions and any gui-
dance provided by pertinent regulations.100
In 1982, Congress instituted an exception to section 9 and, in
doing so, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits
that sanction the taking of a protected species when it is incidental
to other lawful activities.101 The Secretary of the Interior retains
discretion to grant or deny an ITP based on an applicant's submit-
ted habitat conservation plan.10 2 If an ITP is granted, the recipient
is exempt from liability for any taking of a protected species result-
ing from the specific conduct exempted by the permit. 03
D. Clarifying "Harm" to Protected Species
"Harm" is the broadest term included in section 9, and there-
fore significant litigation has determined what activities are prohib-
ited based on the harm inflicted on a protected species.' 04 In 1981,
the FWS recognized the lack of clarity regarding the take provi-
sion's definition of harm and whether habitat modification was in-
cluded.105 The FWS thus redefined harm to include "an act which
actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
98. Id. § 1532(19) (defining take).
99. See Babbitt v. Sweet'Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698
n.11 (1995) (describing broad purpose of ESA).
100. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 739 (explaining how lack of
common law consensus leads to more statutory interpretation).
101. Endangered Species Act § 1539(a) (1) (B) (permitting incidental take
permit exception). "The Secretary may permit ... any taking otherwise prohibited
. . . if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity." Id.
102. See id. § 1539(a) (outlining Interior Secretary's authority to issue ITPs).
103. See id. (providing authority for Secretary to issue ITPs); see also Fedel,
supra note 68, at § 8 (describing ITP process and conditions for mandatory ITP
revocation). Incidental take permits can authorize a single act, a series of acts, or a
number of activities that result in an otherwise unlawful take. Fedel, supra note 68,
at § 8. The FWS is required to revoke an ITP in the event the applicant fails to
comply with the permit's requisite terms and conditions. Id.
104. See Alicia M. Griffin, Beyond "Harm": Abandoning the Actual Injury Standard
for Certain Prohibited Takings Under the Endangered Species Act by Giving Independent
Meaning to "Harassment," 52 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1840-41 (1999) (describing
breadth of harm under ESA).
105. See id. (explaining potentially differing interpretations of harm, which
prompted redefinition of harm).
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wildlife. . ."106 Due to the lack of specific guidance, courts have
diverged on the burden of proof required under the take
provision.' 0 7
In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court considered a facial chal-
lenge to the FWS's definition of harm as including "significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife."108 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of in-
cluding habitat modification or degradation in the definition of
harm.109 just as the Court did not specifically address the jus-
ticiability of an entirely future ESA violation, the Court similarly did
not specifically address the required burden of proof for a
taking."10
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sweet Home, the First
Circuit addressed the degree of certainty required by the ESA to
establish a taking in American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti (American Bald Ea-
gle)."' The court stated that, in order for a plaintiff to enjoin a
controlled deer hunt based on an alleged harm to protected bald
eagles, the plaintiff must show actual harm rather than a merely
potential harm. 112 The First Circuit found the plaintiffs evidence
insufficient to demonstrate that the deer hunt actually harmed the
bald eagles because the evidence merely demonstrated a potential
harm.11s The First Circuit has since maintained a high burden of
proof to establish a taking of a protected species.' 14
Shortly after the First Circuit decided American Bald Eagle,i"5
the Ninth Circuit distinctively interpreted the ESA to require a
106. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009) (defining harm).
107. For an analysis of the differing judicial interpretations of the degree of
certainty required under ESA section 9, see infra notes 108-26 and accompanying
text.
108. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 690
(1995) (considering facial challenge to FWS's definition of harm).
109. See id. at 708 (upholding constitutionality of harm definition including
habitat modification).
110. See id. at 687 (declining to specifically address burden of proof for take);
see generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 741-43 (explaining limited nature of Sweet
Home).
111. Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993) (addressing
proper standard to demonstrate section 9 violation).
112. See id. at 165-66 (holding injunctive relief appropriate only when plaintiff
shows activity actually harmed protected species).
113. See id. at 166 (finding plaintiff failed to show hunt caused actual harm to
bald eagles).
114. See, e.g., Strahan v. Linnon, No. 97-1787, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314 (1st
Cir. July 16, 1998) (stressing insufficiency of both risk of harm and substantial
risk).
115. See Am. Bald Eagle, 9 F.3d at 164 (explaining First Circuit's holding).
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lower burden of proof. 116 In National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington
Northern Railroad, Inc. (Burlington Northern) ,117 the circuit court re-
quired the injury to be "sufficiently likely" to occur in the future,
but not speculative.' 18 The Ninth Circuit, however, slightly altered
the Burlington Northern sufficiently likely standard of certainty in
subsequent cases.' 9
The Ninth Circuit again addressed the requisite degree of cer-
tainty to establish an ESA violation in Rosboro and required the
plaintiffs to demonstrate the activity at issue was "reasonably certain
to injure" the protected species.120 At issue in Rosboro was a citizen
suit seeking to enjoin a timber company from harvesting lumber in
the habitat of a threatened species, claiming the harvest would vio-
late section 9.121 The court interpreted the ESA to permit citizen
suits seeking an injunction "against an imminent threat of harm" to
a protected species and did not require past injury to a protected
species.122 Accordingly, so long as a plaintiff demonstrates that an
activity poses an imminent threat of harm to a protected species,
the activity can be enjoined under an ESA section 9 claim in the
Ninth Circuit.'23
The First and Ninth Circuits are at odds regarding the degree
of certainty required to establish a section 9 violation. 124 This lack
of consensus has led circuit and district courts to require varying
degrees of certainty before a prohibited taking can be estab-
lished. 25 The Ninth Circuit consistently requires a challenged ac-
tivity to pose an imminent threat of harm, whereas the First Circuit-
116. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., Inc., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding plaintiff must prove future violation is reasonably likely).
117. 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994).
118. See id. at 1512 n.8 (explaining that court requires plaintiff to demon-
strate future injury is "sufficiently likely," more than mere speculation).
119. Compare id. (holding plaintiff must prove future injury is "sufficiently
likely"), with Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th
Cir. 1995) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate activity is "reasonably certain to in-
jure" protected animal), and Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that Sweet Home did not overrule Rosboro and showing of "rea-
sonably imminent threat of future harm" is sufficient).
120. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d at 784 (requiring that plaintiff demonstrate
activity is "reasonably certain to injure" protected animal).
121. See id. at 782 (narrating facts).
122. Id. at 784 (describing requisite proof).
123. Id. (concluding that evidence of logging company's significant impair-
ment of Swartz Creek owl's essential behavior patterns was sufficient to demon-
strate reasonable certainty of injury).
124. For an analysis of the differing degrees of certainty standards, see supra
notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
125. See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 767 (describing effect of ambiguous
interpretation on courts); see also Griffin, supra note 104, at 1840-52 (describing
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol22/iss2/3
BATS AND BREEZES TAKE ON FEDERAL POLICY
requires a challenged activity to actually, previously, or currently
harm a protected species.126 While the Supreme Court addressed
section 9 in Sweet Home, it did not address the requisite degree of
certainty. 127
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
"This is a case about bats, wind turbines, and two federal poli-
cies, one favoring protection of endangered species and the other
encouraging development of renewable energy resources."128 The
District Court for the District of Maryland emphasized the impor-
tance of the ESA as a broad protection of endangered and
threatened species, and recognized section 9 as the "cornerstone"
of the ESA. 129 Despite the court's reverence for the ESA, it none-
theless also acknowledged the significance of developing clean, re-
newable energy.130
In Beech Ridge Energy, the district court determined that the
Animal Welfare Institute sufficiently demonstrated the presence of
Indiana bats at the Beech Ridge Project site. 13 1 The court held that
injunctive relief was appropriate against Beech Ridge Energy if its
conduct constituted a section 9 violation. 132 The court interpreted
the ESA based on the text, legislative history, implementing regula-
tions, and case law.133 Ultimately, the court issued an injunction
against Beech Ridge Energy after determining the proffered evi-
various avenues courts have taken when trying to analyze this seemingly "simple,
unambiguous" ESA provision).
126. For a further discussion and breakdown of the differences between the
First and Ninth Circuits, see supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
127. See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995) (analyzing ESA section 9, but not addressing requisite degree of cer-
tainty of take); see generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 743 (explaining limited
nature of Sweet Home).
128. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 542
(D. Md. 2009) (laying out general scope of litigation at hand).
129. See id. at 543-45 (explaining ESA's purpose and broad scope).
130. See id. at 581 (stating wind energy development should be promoted,
albeit in conjunction with ESA).
131. See id. at 575-76 (finding physical characteristics elucidated presence of
Indiana bats at Beech Ridge Project site even though some factors made their pres-
ence less likely).
132. See id. at 580-81 (concluding injunction was appropriate if Beech Ridge
Project would take Indiana bats, thus only issue remaining was appropriate form of
relief).
133. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (explaining factors guiding
court to "carefully scrutinize" its analysis).
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dence substantiated the conclusion that the Beech Ridge Project
would unlawfully take Indiana bats.' 34
A. Justiciability of the Animal Welfare Institute's Future Take
Claim
The district court interpreted the ESA citizen suit provision to
permit claims of future ESA violations, an issue of first impression
in the Fourth Circuit.135 Initially, the court acknowledged that a
"superficial reading" of the citizen suit provision might support
Beech Ridge Energy's argument due to the use of present tense
within the provision.' 36 Beech Ridge Energy unsuccessfully at-
tempted to persuade the court that the citizen suit provision barred
wholly future ESA violations because they lacked any past, current,
or continuing taking.137 Nonetheless, the court quickly discredited
Beech Ridge Energy's analysis by distinguishing the cases on which
they relied from the facts at issue.138
The court instead preferred to conduct its own scrutiny of the
ESA.139 The citizen suit provision specifically provides for an in-
junction to remedy an ESA violation, which the court explained is
designed to effectively prevent future conduct.140 Moreover, a 1973
report by the U.S. House of Representatives clarifies that citizen suit
actions are generally available to obtain injunctive relief for "viola-
tions or potential violations of the Act."'41
The district court also relied on congressional intent to sub-
stantiate the justiciability of claims alleging wholly future ESA viola-
tions. 142 Section 9 broadly prohibits any individual from taking any
endangered or threatened species, and Congress further defined
134. See id. at 580 (describing court's decision to issue injunction against
Beech Ridge Energy).
135. See id. at 560-61 (concluding ESA citizen suit allows claims of wholly fu-
ture violations).
136. Id. at 560 (noting defendants' argument that citizen suit provision does
not grant courtjurisdiction over allegations of wholly future violations is supported
by superficial reading of ESA text).
137. See id. at 560 (describing Beech Ridge Energy's argument).
138. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (observing that defendant
relied on Gwaltney and American Canoe Association v. Murphy, both of which involved
Clean Water Act and failed to address wholly future violations).
139. See id. at 561 (describing court's preference to analyze ESA).
140. See id. at 560-61 (identifying purpose of injunctions as preventing future
actions, and rejecting notion that past action is required).
141. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-412 (1973)) (utilizing House report to sub-
stantiate injunction as relief for "violations or potential violations").
142. See id. at 561 (relying on U.S. Senate's confirmation of definition and
application of take).
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take to include "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect or to attempt to engage in any such con-
duct." 143 The district court inferred that the inclusion of an "at-
tempt" to perform any of the prohibited actions signified
Congress's intent to include claims of future takings under section
9.144
Finally, the court postulated that the purpose of the ESA would
be frustrated if claims alleging wholly future violations were pre-
cluded under the citizen suit provision.'45 If courts were restricted
to adjudicating citizen suits on alleged taking violations only after
an endangered species was affected, the ESA would no longer
prophylactically safeguard the protected species from harm or
death.14 6 Based on the aforementioned logic, the District Court for
the District of Maryland found citizen suits alleging wholly future
ESA violations to be justiciable. 1 4 7
B. Just How Sure Must the Court Be?
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit previously
explored the degree of certainty required to establish a section 9
violation under the ESA. 148 The Animal Welfare Institute insisted
the ESA required it to demonstrate that a taking is more likely than
not, whereas Beech Ridge Energy maintained that the Animal Wel-
fare Institute must prove the wind farm is certain to take a pro-
tected species.149 The district court recognized the absence of both
a designated degree of certainty and a consensus among courts,
and therefore turned to the FWS regulations and other circuit
court decisions for guidance. 15
143. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a) (1) (B)
(2006) (stating ESA take provision and defining take).
144. See Endangered Species Act § 1532(19) (relying on text of definition to
infer forward-looking intent); see also Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 561
(using Senate report to confirm broad scope of take provision).
145. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (analyzing Beech Ridge
Energy's claim in light of purpose of ESA).
146. Id. at 560-61 (discussing deleterious effects of contrary holding).
147. See id. at 561 (concluding that citizen suit provision permits claims of
wholly future ESA violations without past violation).
148. See id. (noting lack of guidance from Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit
regarding requisite degree of certainty).
149. See id. (describing both parties' arguments). Animal Welfare Institute
argued that "ordinary principles of tort causation" should apply, and thus it need
only demonstrate that a take is more likely than not. Id. Beech Ridge Energy,
however, argued that Animal Welfare Institute must prove that the Beech Ridge
Project is "certain to harm, kill, or wound Indiana bats." Id.
150. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 562-64 (utilizing regulations
implementing ESA to reach conclusion).
2011] 243
19
Balzer: Bats and Breezes Take on Federal Policy: The Windy Effects of Ani
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
244 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XXII: p. 225
The court began its evaluation presuming the requisite degree
of certainty for any harm was higher than "merely likely," with
which both the Animal Welfare Institute and Beech Ridge Energy
agreed.15' The precise degree of certainty required, according to
the court, hinged on the use of "actually" in the FWS definition of
harm: "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife."152 The court
relied on the FWS regulation's explanatory comments in support of
its conclusion that actually requires a higher degree of certainty
than merely likely.153 The comments succinctly clarified that an al-
leged harm could not be speculative, and section 9 purports to
"avoid injury to protected wildlife due to significant habitat modifi-
cation, while at the same time precluding a taking where no actual
injury is shown."' 54
The district court looked to prior cases for further guidance.' 55
The court conceded that the Supreme Court's Sweet Home decision
supported the notion that a mere likelihood of harm is insufficient
because the take provision requires a non-speculative, actual in-
jury.15 6 Nonetheless, the district court also recognized, albeit in a
footnote, the limited nature of the Sweet Home decision because the
requisite degree of certainty to establish a taking was not directly at
151. See id. at 562 (noting that comparison of harass definition with harm
definition yields conclusion that harm must be more than merely likely). Compare
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009) (defining "harass" as "an intentional or negligent act or
omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it"), with 50
C.F.R § 17.3 (2009) (defining harm as "an act which actually kills or injures wild-
life"). Both Animal Welfare Institute and Beech Ridge Energy agreed the FWS
regulations demand a higher requisite degree of certainty for an alleged harm, as
opposed to an allegation based on the definition of harass. Beech Ridge Energy, 675
F. Supp. 2d at 561 n.26, 562. This conclusion was based on the variance between
the use of "likelihood" in the definition of harass and the use of "actually" in the
definition of harm. Id. Thus, the court concluded the use of "actually" denoted
that a plaintiff must prove a harm is "more than merely 'likely' to occur." Id.
152. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (emphasis added) (explaining
significance of "actually" in definition). For a further explanation of the impor-
tance of "actually" in definitions, see supra note 151.
153. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of
"Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 54748-01 (Nov. 4, 1981) (describing harm redefinition as
necessary "to make it clear that an actual injury to a listed species must be found
for there to be taking under section 9").
154. Id. (describing requirement of actual harm); see also Beech Ridge Energy,
675 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (noting harm cannot be speculative).
155. For a further discussion of the court's reliance on prior cases, see infra
notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
156. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (interpreting Sweet Home to
require "actual" injury). For an explanation of the Sweet Home decision, see supra
notes 85-87, 108-10 and accompanying text.
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issue in that case.' 57 The Sweet Home holding was therefore incon-
clusive on the issue.158
Regarding the divergent First and Ninth Circuit judgments
concerning the degree of certainty required to establish a section 9
violation, the court distinguished the varying standards and de-
clared that it "agrees with the standard adopted in Marbled Murre-
let."' 59 The court rationalized the Marbled Murrelet standard-
requiring a reasonable certainty of imminent harm to a protected
species-as consistent with the purpose of the ESA, its legislative his-
tory, the implementing regulations, and the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Sweet Home.'6 o In conclusion, the district court announced
that the Animal Welfare Institute must prove the Beech Ridge Pro-
ject was "reasonably certain to imminently harm, kill, or wound the
listed species."16 1
C. Indiana Bat Presence at Beech Ridge Project
Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the
district court concluded with "virtual certainty" that Indiana bats
were present at the Beech Ridge Project site.' 62 Beech Ridge En-
ergy attempted to use expert testimony to persuade the court that,
despite the presence of Indiana bats, the wind turbines would not
take the protected species due to the height of the wind turbines
157. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 562 n.27 (describing lack of
particularly relevant guidance from Sweet Home).
158. See id. (noting inconclusiveness of Sweet Home opinion on present
litigation).
159. For an analysis of the First and Ninth Circuits' standards, see supra notes
112-22 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165-66
(1st Cir. 1993) (holding that speculative risk of harm is insufficient and actual
harm must be proved to establish taking under ESA). But see, e.g., Marbled Murrelet
v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding reasonable certainty of im-
minent harm to endangered species was sufficient), and Defenders of Wildlife v.
Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiff must prove activity
would harm or would more likely than not harass endangered species).
160. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (citing Marbled Murrelet stan-
dard). For a thorough analysis of the court's reliance on the legislative history, see
supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
161. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (stating district court's
conclusion).
162. See id. at 575 (finding Indiana bat's presence at Beech Ridge Project site
during spring, summer, and fall as virtually certain). The court weighed all evi-
dence presented and identified three factors as determinative to holding that Indi-
ana bats were present at the Beech Ridge Energy site: first, the close proximity of
Indiana Bat hibernation locations to the site; second, the physical characteristics of
the site increased the likelihood of Indian bats being present; and third, acoustical
data confirmed the presence of Indiana bats to a virtual certainty. Id. at 575-76.
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and the lack of evidence proving wind turbines kill Indiana bats.16 3
Nonetheless, the court found the Animal Welfare Institute's experts
more credible and therefore relied on their testimony regarding
the physical characteristics surrounding the Beech Ridge Project.16'
The district court reluctantly issued injunctive relief in favor of the
Animal Welfare Institute after unavoidably concluding that "there is
a virtual certainty that Indiana bats will be harmed, wounded, or
killed imminently by the Beech Ridge Project, in violation of § 9 of
the ESA, during the spring, summer and fall."165
V. CIUTIcAL ANALYSIS
Although the District Court for the District of Maryland prop-
erly issued an injunction against Beech Ridge Energy, the decision
expands the body of case law that applies various rationales and
standards to prove an ESA section 9 violation. 166 Regardless of
which standard the court adopted, inherent discrepancies remain
between the comprehensive purpose of the ESA and the FWS's defi-
nition of harm.167 In the midst of the conflict over the justiciability
163. See id. at 576-77 (expounding upon Beech Ridge Energy's arguments
that Indiana bats do not fly at height of turbine blades and that no Indiana bats
have been confirmed dead at any wind power project in United States). Ex-
panding research capabilities surrounding bats has shown that bats can fly a kilo-
meter or more above the ground, into the range of the wind turbine blades, and
the height at which Indiana bats forage for food is unrelated to the height at which
Indiana bats migrate. Id. at 577. Wind turbine projects across the country have
reported killed bats, and Indiana bats are no more capable of avoiding death from
wind turbines than any other bat species. Id. at 577-78.
164. See id. at 564-67, 579 (discussing expert witnesses' credentials). The
court accepted Animal Welfare Institute's expert witness' arguments over Beech
Ridge Energy's contentions. Id. at 567. The court found no evidence to suggest
that Indiana bats would not fly at the height of the wind turbines. Id. at 578. Addi-
tionally, Animal Welfare Institute sufficiently persuaded the court that Indiana bats
do not behave differently than other bat species and, thus, they confront the same
risk of any bat species to be harmed or killed by wind turbines. Id. at 578-79.
Finally, the lack of concrete evidence confirming a deceased Indiana bat at any
wind turbine project across the nation merely illustrates the few, and often ineffi-
cient, post-mortality studies, as well as the true nature of the Indiana bat as an
endangered species. Id. at 579.
165. Id. at 579, 581, 583 (issuing injunction to enjoin operation of all wind
turbines under construction, except during winter months, but allowing for com-
pletion of construction of wind turbines already begun). The district court rea-
soned that the incidental take permit process under the ESA was available and
urged Beech Ridge Energy to apply for an ITP, as was suggested on numerous
occasions by the FWS prior to litigation. Id.
166. For a thorough analysis of the case law applying varying standards, see
supra notes 82-95, 108-26 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of the inherent discrepancies between the ESA's pur-
pose and FWS's definition of harm, see infra notes 174-80, 196-98 and accompany-
ing text.
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of future ESA violations and the degree of certainty required to es-
tablish section 9 violations, the government continues to promote
clean, renewable energy and wind energy continues to flourish.168
This case underscores the importance of two prominent federal
policies working in concert.169
A. Lack of Specificity of ESA's Definition of Take
Section 9 of the ESA forbids any person from taking any en-
dangered species, which is further defined to include "harass,
harm. . . wound, kill. . . or to attempt to engage in any such con-
duct."170 Even with the auxiliary guidance of FWS regulations on
the specific actions encompassed by each descriptive word within
the take prohibition, courts across the nation continue to reach di-
vergent holdings. 171 In fact, the judicial system has yet to reach a
consensus on the redressability of claims alleging entirely future
ESA violations.172
B. The District Court's Failure to Distinguish Between Divergent
Rationales Concerning Wholly Future Violations of ESA
As discussed in Part III, Congress passed the ESA to protect
endangered and threatened species, as well as their habitats, from
harm.173 Congress intended the ESA to eventually reverse the dam-
age inflicted upon endangered and threatened species, "whatever
the cost," and provide expansive protection by prohibiting "every
conceivable way a person can take or attempt to take any [endan-
gered or threatened] species."174 The fundamental nature of the
ESA citizen suit provision provides individuals with the legal means,
in the form of injunctive relief, to enjoin conduct unlawfully effect-
168. For an examination of the United States' renewable energy initiatives,
see infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
169. See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 583
(D. Md. 2009) (describing importance of developing wind energy as well as impor-
tance of wind energy being "good neighbors").
170. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1532(19)
(2006) (prohibiting any taking of protected species and defining what actions con-
stitute taking).
171. For a discussion of the lack of judicial consensus despite guidance pro-
vided by FWS regulations, see supra notes 82-95, 108-26 and accompanying text.
172. For an examination of the lack of consensus regarding redressability, see
supra notes 82-95, 108-26 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the ESA's purpose and significance, see supra notes
68-72 and accompanying text.
174. Griffin, supra note 104, at 1853-54 (detailing ESA's history).
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ing a taking of a protected species.'75 Generally, injunctive relief is
available when the court or jury deems it appropriate to halt partic-
ular conduct, most often before the harm in question occurs.176
Issuing injunctions in this manner is seemingly at odds with the
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Sweet Home.'77 The Court expli-
cated that "the Government cannot enforce the § 9 prohibition un-
til an animal has actually been killed or injured." 78 A literal
reading of the Court's statement mandates that a protected animal
must incur actual injury prior to the enjoinment of the activity
under section 9.179 While the Court's decision focused mainly on
habitat modification, the Court also referred to section 9 prohibi-
tions as a whole rather than confining its language to habitat modi-
fication as a subsection of section 9.1so The Supreme Court's
holding is in accord with the FWS definition of harm as "an act
which actually kills or injures wildlife." 18' The Ninth Circuit and
District Court for the District of Maryland, however, suggest the
Court's decision is inconsistent with the broad purpose of the ESA
and injunctive relief.'82
Perhaps due to this underlying conflict between Sweet Home
and the ESA's purpose, the Ninth Circuit announced in Marbled
175. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2006)
(offering citizen suits as means to enforce ESA).
176. Id. (providing availability of injunctive relief).
177. See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 751 (discussing impact of Sweet Home on
availability of citizen take claims under ESA). Compare Endangered Species Act
§ 15 3 0(g) (1) (A) (stating ESA citizen suit provision), with Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1995) (explaining govern-
ment cannot enforce ESA section 9 without proof of actual harm).
178. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702-03 (explicating Supreme Court's holding); see
also Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 751 (discussing Sweet Home's impact on timing of
citizen suit alleging ESA take violation). One commentator has suggested that the
Supreme Court did not foresee the necessity of injunctions prior to a take, at least
with regard to habitat modification. Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 751.
179. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702-03 (explaining section 9 cannot be enforced
until protected animal is actually killed or injured).
180. See id. (discussing respondent's challenge to FWS regulation as facial
rather than as applied challenge).
181. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009) (providing definition of harm), with
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702-03 (1995) (noting that government cannot enforce
ESA section 9 without proof of actual harm).
182. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009) (offering definition of harm), with En-
dangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006) (stating purpose of ESA
is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species
and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for
the conservation of endangered species and threatened species"), and Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Hill 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (describing ESA as "most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any na-
tion"), and Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698 (describing ESA's broad purpose of protect-
ing against any activities inflicting prohibited harms).
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Murrelet its decision to uphold its prior decisions and continue to
recognize the justiciability of wholly future ESA violation claims
with no required showing of actual harm.183 When the issue of fu-
ture ESA violations was presented to the First Circuit in American
Bald Eagle, the circuit court interpreted the FWS regulations to bar
claims of wholly future ESA violations and required the claimant to
demonstrate that a protected species is actually killed or injured.184
The First Circuit confirmed its interpretation of the ESA and the
requirement of actual harm in Strahan, denying injunctive relief
based solely upon a risk of harm to an endangered species.' 8 5
Accordingly, when Beech Ridge Energy reached the District Court
for the District of Maryland, the First and Ninth Circuits differed
regarding the availability of the ESA citizen suit provision for claims
alleging solely future violations.1 86 The district court endorsed the
Ninth Circuit's rationale, choosing to permit such claims because
doing so was consistent with the purpose of injunctive relief and
Congress's intent to prohibit any attempt to take an endangered
species.18 7 The Beech Ridge Energy opinion clearly characterized the
objectives of injunctive relief, the purpose of the ESA, the congres-
sional intent, and the definition of the take prohibition as consis-
tent with the holding.188 Yet, the court failed to mention both the
183. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining Sweet Home did not require Supreme Court to address "whether a showing
of threat of future harm is sufficient for an injunction"). The Ninth Circuit distin-
guished Sweet Home as a facial challenge to the definition of harm, with any inter-
pretation from Sweet Home requiring past injury as dictum. Id. Additionally, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted Sweet Home as approving a reading of the ESA whereby
the statute prevents activity that will cause future harm. Id. at 1066. For an expla-
nation of the underlying conflict between the Sweet Home decision and the ESA's
purpose, see supra notes 178-82.
184. See Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165-66 (1st Cir. 1993) (interpret-
ing FWS regulatory definition of harm). The First Circuit refused to adopt a nu-
merical standard to determine harm, reasoning that any numerical standard would
be an arbitrary number. Id. at 165. Rather, the court relied on the FWS's harm
definition and the accompanying commentary to require a showing of actual
harm. Id.
185. See Strahan v. Linnon, No. 97-1787, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, at *13
(1st Cir. July 16, 1998) (announcing First Circuit always required plaintiff show
actual harm to endangered species).
186. For a discussion of the lack of consensus on the justiciability of wholly
future ESA violations, see supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
187. See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 583
(D. Md. 2009) (agreeing with Ninth Circuit standard enunciated in Marbled
Murrelet).
188. See id. at 560-61 (explaining Ninth Circuit decisions are consistent with
text of citizen suit provision, legislative history, and purpose of ESA). Compare En-
dangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46
Fed. Reg. 54748 (Nov. 4, 1981) (explaining redefinition of harm means "any ac-
tion, including habitat modification, which actually kills or injures wildlife"), with
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First Circuit's converse approach as well as the Supreme Court's
opinion in Sweet Home. 1s9
Regardless of which rationale the district court adopted, the
ESA's purpose, the nature of injunctions, and the intentional broad
scope of the take provision were bound to clash with the FWS regu-
lations' explicit definition of harm and the guidance of Sweet
Home.190 Until the issue is resolved either through congressional or
judicial action, courts will continue to reach divergent
interpretations.
C. Leading the District Court Down a Windy Road: Conflict
Between Congressional Intent and Agency Regulations
The ESA provides a statutory cause of action that often yields
claims seeking injunctive relief to abate an action allegedly in viola-
tion of the statute.191 Claims alleging a violation of the take provi-
sion frequently depend on a judge or jury to weigh the submitted
evidence and determine the likelihood of a violation.192 The plain-
tiff's burden of proof therefore drastically impacts the verdict.s93
The District Court for the District of Maryland endeavored to deter-
mine the degree of certainty with which the Animal Welfare Insti-
tute was required to prove the Beech Ridge Project would take
Indiana bats.194 Despite the lack of Supreme Court or Fourth Cir-
cuit guidance, the ESA, FWS regulations, and First and Ninth Cir-
Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1065 (observing that Sweet Home did not require Su-
preme Court to address "whether a showing of threat of future harm is sufficient
for an injunction"). The stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of endangered
species and threatened species." Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(b) (2006) (offering statutory goals).
189. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61 (failing to analyze First
Circuit guidance regarding wholly future ESA violations).
190. For a discussion of the inherent discrepancies between the ESA's pur-
pose, nature of injunctions, broad scope of the take provision, FWS regulations,
and Sweet Home decision, see supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
191. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 763-64 (explaining types of ESA
claims).
192. Id. at 764 (explaining how different burdens of proof potentially result
in different outcomes).
193. See generally id. (describing burden of proof's significance and how vary-
ing burdens can drastically alter litigation).
194. See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561
(D. Md. 2009) (noting that requisite degree of certainty under section 9 was issue
of first impression for Fourth Circuit).
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cuits each shed light on the requisite degree of certainty, though
the guidance is often divergent and convoluted.'95
The FWS redefined harm in 1981 to include "an act which ac-
tually kills or injures wildlife," effectively diminishing the scope of
prohibited conduct.196 A strict reading of the text alone tends to
support the conclusion that a plaintiff must absolutely prove actual
death or injury to a protected species, rather than a hypothetical or
potential future risk of harm.197 Logically, this rationale also sug-
gests that courts may not issue injunctions until the plaintiff suffi-
ciently demonstrates how the particular conduct is inflicting
harm.198
Conversely, the historical breadth of the ESA as a means to
protect endangered and threatened species at "whatever the cost"
supports a finding that a plaintiff need only establish a lesser de-
gree of certainty than actual harm.199 This dichotomy is precisely
where the First and Ninth Circuits split-the First Circuit adopting
the former conclusion, the Ninth Circuit adopting the latter-when
Beech Ridge Energy was decided.200 The District Court for the District
of Maryland was bound to make a definitive determination to adopt
either the First Circuit's standard of showing actual harm or the
Ninth Circuit's standard of establishing a reasonable certainty of
imminent harm.201
Had the district court adopted the First Circuit's rationale and
required the Animal Welfare Institute to prove that the Beech
Ridge Project actually killed or injured Indiana bats, the district
court could not have enjoined the construction and eventual opera-
tion of the wind energy project until Indiana bats were actually
195. For a thorough analysis of the lack of judicial consensus regarding a
plaintiff's burden of proof under section 9, see supra notes 107-16 and accompany-
ing text.
196. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009) (redefining harm).
197. Id. (providing text of harm redefinition); see generally Griffin, supra note
104, at 1858 (confirming that FWS's 1981 definition of harm rejected significant
risk of harm standard).
198. See, e.g., Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165-66 (1st Cir. 1993) (rely-
ing on FWS definition of harm and holding injunctive relief available only after
plaintiffs show conduct "has actually harmed the species or if continued will actu-
ally, as opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species").
199. See Griffin, supra note 104, at 1853-57 (explaining how congressional in-
tent supports standard lower than actual harm). For a discussion of the ESA's
broad purpose, see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
200. For an analysis of courts' application of the various standards, see supra
notes 82-95, 108-26 and accompanying text.
201. See generally Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d
540, 563 (D. Md. 2009) (discussing First and Ninth Circuits' standards).
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harmed. 202 This result would have been congruent with the FWS's
regulatory requirement of actual harm. 203 Such a result would have
blatantly disregarded the district court's determination that the
Beech Ridge Project posed a significant threat to Indiana bats, how-
ever.204 Moreover, this result would have neglected to comprehend
the role of the FWS's regulatory definition in the broader context
of the ESA. 20 5
The district court instead adopted the Ninth Circuit's standard
and found injunctive relief appropriate because the Animal Welfare
Institute sufficiently established that the Beech Ridge Project was
reasonably certain to imminently harm Indiana bats.206 This stan-
dard more adequately effectuates the purpose and goals of the ESA,
and also recognizes that harm cannot be merely speculative. 207 The
district court focused much of its explanation on why the chosen
degree of certainty was higher than a mere likelihood of harm
rather than explaining why actual harm was not required. 208 The
court also neglected to justify the chosen degree of certainty re-
quired to establish an ESA section 9 claim in light of the FWS's
regulatory requirement of actual harm. 209 Regardless of the chosen
standard, the court was bound to contradict either the FWS's re-
quirement of the conduct actually killing or injuring a protected
species or the expansive scope of the ESA. 210
202. See generally Griffin, supra note 104, at 1857-60 (explaining significant risk
of harm does not result in harm). For a discussion of the First Circuit's rationale,
see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
203. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009) (defining harm as "an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife"); see also Griffin, supra note 104, at 1851-52 (identifying Supreme
Court interpretation of actual harm standard as congruent with regulations).
204. Compare Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 576 (concluding that pres-
ence of Indiana bats at site was virtual certainty, but unable to determine with
absolute certainty due to lack of exacting evidence), with 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009)
(defining harm as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife").
205. For a discussion of the ESA's purpose, see supra notes 68-71, 95-104 and
accompanying text.
206. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 563-64, 576 (adopting Ninth Circuit
burden of proof standard).
207. See generally Griffin, supra note 104, at 1858-60 (explaining that signifi-
cant risk of harm standard comports with congressional intent more effectively
than actual harm requirement, but fails to satisfy regulatory requirement of actual
harm). For a description of the burden of proof standard adopted by the Ninth
Circuit, see supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
208. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 562-64 (noting that, given his-
tory of regulatory definition, standard must be greater than merely likely).
209. See id. (declining to analyze plaintiffs burden of proof in light of FWS
regulations).
210. For an analysis of the conflicting judicial ESA interpretations, see supra
notes 191-209 and accompanying text.
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VI. IMPACT
Climate change is a substantial and material concern that in-
creasingly affects individuals, suburban communities, cities, farm-
ers, and businesses across the United States.211  Improved
technology and a growing wealth of evidence suggest a tangible cor-
relation between certain human activities and climate change. 212
The United States has thus endeavored to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by devoting significant funds and resources to the devel-
opment of clean, renewable energy. 213 The federal government's
response to climate change is valiant and monumental, but any ac-
tion must be cognizant of longstanding federal policies and initia-
tives. 214 No single federal policy should dictate the outcome of
future initiatives; rather, all federal policies and initiatives must
function in concert.215
Wind energy development is often criticized and impeded due
to the danger wind turbines pose to avian and bat populations.2 16
When animals affected by wind energy projects are identified as an
endangered or threatened species under the ESA, wind energy de-
velopment can be further encumbered.217 It is crucial, therefore,
that developers conduct thorough analyses of potential impacts on
protected species and discuss their findings with both state and fed-
eral authorities. 218
Beech Ridge Energy exemplifies the significance of conducting
thorough analyses of potential wind energy facilities and communi-
cating with regulatory officials. 219 Had Beech Ridge Energy heeded
the FWS's warnings regarding the insufficiency of its mist-net
211. See generally Climate Change Indicators, supra note 7, at 4-7 (examining sig-
nificant climate change indicators in United States).
212. See generally id. (detailing relationship between human activities and cli-
mate change).
213. For a discussion of the United States' efforts to promote clean, renewa-
ble energy, see supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Goel, supra note 15, at 42 (discussing importance of renewa-
ble energy production's compliance with federal environmental laws).
215. See generally id. (asserting that energy growth cannot trump adherence to
existing environmental laws).
216. See generally id. (describing various criticisms of wind energy facilities).
217. See generally Wildermuth, supra note 22, at 534-35 (noting importance
and ability of renewable energy sources to work in conjunction with existing fed-
eral policies).
218. See generally Goel, supra note 15, at 42 (discussing importance of review-
ing impacts on endangered species, which can greatly hinder clean, renewable
energy developments if not done properly).
219. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d
540, 581-82 (D. Md. 2009) (describing detrimental effect of Beech Ridge Energy's
failure to heed FWS's advice or apply for ITP, and identifying it as "tragedy").
2532011]
29
Balzer: Bats and Breezes Take on Federal Policy: The Windy Effects of Ani
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
254 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XXII: p. 225
surveys or applied for an ITP, it could have avoided the costs of
litigation. 220 The ITP is an exception to the section 9 prohibition
against any taking of a protected species and recognizes instances
in which a taking is unavoidable.221 The ITP process is an avenue
by which clean, renewable energy development may continue in
conjunction with important federal policies protecting endangered
and threatened species. 222 Unfortunately for Beech Ridge Energy,
its failure to heed the FWS's recommendations resulted in substan-
tial delays and litigation costs. 2 2 3
Further, once wind energy developers perceive a protected
species' potential presence in the vicinity of their facility, they must
determine whether the project remains financially viable. 224 POSSi-
ble future litigation coupled with more in-depth analysis, reporting,
and monitoring might persuade the developer to seek a less-costly
alternative location.225 In order to resolutely make this determina-
tion, a wind energy developer should review controlling law in the
applicable jurisdiction because these precedents could dramatically
influence the choice between forging ahead or selecting a more
suitable location. 226 Yet, the lack of a consensus among courts in-
terpreting the ESA may prevent developers from making a compe-
tent decision, especially in jurisdictions outside the First or Ninth
220. See id. at 582 (positing that, if FWS recommendations were followed,
Beech Ridge Energy "would not be in the unfortunate situation in which they now
find themselves").
221. For an examination of the availability of incidental take permits, see
supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
222. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B) (2006) (pro-
viding Interior Secretary with authority to issue ITPs); see generally Goel, supra note
15, at 42 (identifying ITPs as means for wind energy developers to gain access to
locations that would otherwise result in take).
223. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (explaining consequences of
Beech Ridge Energy neglecting FWS's recommendations). Beech Ridge Energy
rationalized its disregard of the FWS's advice through the "financial burden" and
"delaying construction" of the project that would ensue if the advice had been
followed. Id. Yet, its failure to heed FWS recommendations ultimately inhibited
Beech Ridge Energy even further. Id.
224. See generally Goel, supra note 15, at 42 (describing importance of con-
ducting thorough impact analysis on endangered species prior to commencing
construction or operation of projects).
225. See generally Wildermuth, supra note 22, at 518-19 (describing effects of
listing species as endangered or threatened).
226. Cf Griffin, supra note 104, at 1852-60 (explaining drastic differences be-
tween judicial interpretations of ESA).
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Circuits. 2 2 7 Beech Ridge Energy elucidates one path the Fourth Cir-
cuit might follow. 228
Without a judicial consensus discerning whether an individual
can commence a suit for an entirely future ESA violation, wind en-
ergy developers are left uncertain regarding when they might face
litigation.2 2 9 The uncertainty of a court's willingness and ability to
adjudicate wholly future ESA violations may also require wind en-
ergy developers to expend resources in their defense when, in fact,
the lawsuit is frivolous and untimely.23 0 Moreover, without agree-
ment among courts on the required proof for a prohibited taking,
developers must speculate about how much evidence is necessary to
prove the presence of an endangered species and rebut a chal-
lenger.2 3 1 The District Court for the District of Maryland suggested
that the requisite degree of certainty issue was merely of academic
interest.23 2 In reality, the degree of certainty required to establish a
section 9 violation could drastically alter the amount of resources
wind farm developers must devote to pre-construction research.233
Jurisdictions that impose a lower burden of proof on challeng-
ers, such as the District Court for the District of Maryland, enable
challengers to enjoin wind energy facilities with less-precise evi-
dence. 234 Overall, this approach might result in an increased num-
ber of lawsuits; wind energy developers devoting more resources to
endangered species research; greater use of ITPs; greater incur-
rence of legal fees; and more stringent conditions imposed on the
227. See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 764, 767 (necessitating court justifica-
tion for applicable burden of proof in take claims, and describing effect of differ-
ent burdens on outcomes of litigated take claims).
228. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61 (describing issues addressed
by district court as issues of first impression for Fourth Circuit).
229. For an analysis of the conflicting judicial interpretations regarding
claims alleging wholly future ESA violations, see supra notes 82-96 and accompany-
ing text.
230. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 750-56 (explaining effect of
varying interpretations on justiciability of wholly future claims).
231. See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 763 (describing standard of proof issue
as most significant variable in ESA litigation and identifying effect of varying evi-
dentiary standards).
232. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 564 n.31 (describing requisite
degree of certainty as perhaps merely issue of "academic interest").
233. For an explanation of how differing degrees of certainty required to
prove take affect wind farm developers' efforts, see infra notes 234-41 and accom-
panying text.
234. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 764 (describing higher likeli-
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operation of the wind energy facility.2 35 Ultimately, requiring a
lower burden of proof to establish a section 9 claim may convince a
developer in a particular jurisdiction to select an alternate
location. 236
In contrast, jurisdictions imposing a higher burden of proof on
challengers, such as the First Circuit, limit challengers to success-
fully enjoining wind energy facilities only when they offer the most
exacting evidence.237 In these jurisdictions, wind energy developers
are not nearly as burdened by the additional expenditures as in a
jurisdiction with a lower burden of proof.2 38 Nonetheless, even
though developers may not incur additional litigation expenses,
they must remain cognizant of, and comply with, all ESA require-
ments regarding any present endangered or threatened species.239
The potential consequences imposed by either type of jurisdiction
on a wind energy developer are burdensome. 240 When the control-
ling law is obscure or not yet determined, however, the conse-
quences are compounded. 241
The district court's decision in Beech Ridge Energy does not rec-
tify the conflicting First and Ninth Circuit's ESA interpretations.242
Rather, the District Court for the District of Maryland clarified its
conformity with the Ninth Circuit.243 The court recognized the jus-
235. See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 764-68 (evaluating effects of lower bur-
den of proof for take violations); see also generally Court Halts Construction and Limits
Operation of Wind Project for Failure to Comply with Endangered Species Act, WHITE &
CASE (Dec. 2009), http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/e878f214-8fb8-45
55-97b8-f79cb25fd207/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4d6463f4-08ee4d03-
9a6f-013f69dc2fc/alertEIPF Windv2.pdf (describing various requirements for
wind farm developers choosing to develop in locations where protected species
may be present).
236. See generally Goel, supra note 15, at 42 (explaining how additional analysis
and research requirements could prove too burdensome for wind farm
developers).
237. Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 764 (describing how higher burden of
proof demands more exacting evidence from plaintiffs before obtaining injunc-
tions against wind farm developers).
238. See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 764-68 (examining effects of higher bur-
den of proof for take violations).
239. See generally Goel, supra note 15, at 42 (emphasizing high cost of progress
for wind energy without thorough detection and review of impact on protected
species).
240. For a discussion of the consequences of varying burdens of proof, see
supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
241. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 762-63 (representing standard
of proof issue as most significant variable in ESA take litigation).
242. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561-63
(D. Md. 2009) (adopting Ninth Circuit's standard for both wholly future ESA viola-
tions and requisite burden of proof).
243. Id. at 563-64 (adopting Ninth Circuit's reasonable certainty standard).
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ticiability of claims alleging wholly future ESA violations and re-
quired the Animal Welfare Institute to prove the Beech Ridge
Project was reasonably certain to imminently harm Indiana bats.2 44
While the court's rationale contains certain flaws, the decision pro-
vides guidance to future wind energy developers within the court's
jurisdiction on these consequential determinations.2 4 5
Beech Ridge Energy epitomizes the strategic capability of two fed-
eral policies to work in concert and concurrently achieve two
equally important goals.24 6 In fact, the parties involved in the case
eventually reached a settlement which approved a limited number
of wind turbines for operation and afforded greater protection to
Indiana bats through restrictions on the turbines' operation. 247
The settlement agreement was contingent upon Beech Ridge En-
ergy applying for an ITP and the FWS is currently deciding whether
to grant or deny the permit.2 48 Ultimately, Beech Ridge Energy just
may set the standard for how future wind energy projects must ad-
dress the protection of Indiana bats and similarly endangered
species.249
Kirsten S. Balzer*
244. For an analysis of the district court's rationale, see supra notes 128-65
and accompanying text.
245. See Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61 (explaining how both
considerations were issues of first impression for Fourth Circuit).
246. See id. at 581 (describing thrust of case). "The two vital federal policies at
issue in this care are not necessarily in conflict . . . . The development of wind
energy can and should be encouraged, but wind turbines must be good neigh-
bors." Id. at 581, 583.
247. See Stipulation at 1-7 Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F.
Supp. 2d 540 (D. Md. 2009) (No. 09-1519 (RWT)), available at http://www.wind
action.org/documents/25382. Animal Welfare Institute and Beech Ridge Energy
stipulated to the following key points: the Beech Ridge Project would abandon
thirty one turbine locations nearest the Indiana bat hibernacula; Beech Ridge En-
ergy committed to obtaining an ITP and habitat conservation plan; turbines would
operate on a restricted schedule until the ITP is granted; searches would be per-
formed regularly for killed bats; and Beech Ridge Energy rescinded its appeals
rights to the Fourth Circuit. Id.
248. See id. (illustrating conditions upon which parties agreed).
249. See Beech Ridge Wind Project Settlement Agreement, INDUS. WiND AcrON
GROUP (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.windaction.org/documents/25382 (expressing
that many believe "this project will set the bar for how wind companies must oper-
ate with regard to bats and other wildlife in the eastern U.S.").
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